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1. Introduction
In 1984 a photographer named Steve McCurry traveled to Pakistan in order to document
the ordeal of Afghanistan’s refugees, orphaned during the Soviet Union’s bombing of
Afghanistan. In the refugee camp Nasir Bagh, which was a sea of tents, he took a photograph
of a young girl approximately at the age of 13. The portrait by Steve McCurry turned out to
be one of those images that sears the heart, and in June 1985 it ran on the cover of National
Geographic. The girl’s sea green eyes have captivated the world since then and because no
one knew her name she became known as the “Afghan girl”.
In January 2002, 17 year later, a team from National Geographic Television brought McCurry
back to Pakistan to search for the girl with green eyes. When they showed her picture
around Nasir Bagh, the still standing refugee camp, there were a number of women who
came forward and identified themselves erroneously as the famous Afghan girl. In addition,
after being shown the 1985 photo, a handful of young men falsely claimed the Afghan girl as
their wife. The team was able to finally confirm her identity using the iris feature analysis
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which matched her iris patterns to those of
the photograph with almost full certainty (Braun, 2003). Her name was Sharbat Gula, then
around the age of 30, and she had not been photographed since. The revealment of Sharbat
Gula’s identity manifested the strength of iris recognition technologies. Figure 1 (a) shows
the original image of her which was printed on the cover of National Geographic in 1985 and
another portrait taken in 2002 which was used for identification.
Iris biometrics refers to high confidence recognition of a person’s identity by mathematical
analysis of the random patterns that are visible within the iris of an eye from some distance
(Daugman, 2004). Figure 1 (b) shows a good-quality NIR infrared image of an human eye
captured by an iris recognition device. In contrast to other biometric characteristics, such as
fingerprints (Maltoni et al., 2009), the iris is a protected internal organ whose random texture
is complex, unique, and very stable throughout life. Because the randomness of iris patterns
has very high dimensionality, recognition decisions are made with confidence levels, high
enough to support rapid and reliable exhaustive searches through national-sized databases.
Until now iris recognition has been successfully applied in diverse access control systems
managing large-scale user database. For instance, in the UK project IRIS (Iris Recognition
Immigration System), over a million frequent travelers have registered with the system
for automated border-crossing using iris recognition. IRIS is in operation on different UK
9
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Fig. 1. (a) Sharbat Gula at the age of approximately 13 and 30 (taken from Daugman (2011))
(b) Sample image of a person’s iris (taken from CASIAv3-Interval iris database).
airports including London Heathrow and Gatwick, Manchester and Birmingham. While the
registration process usually takes between 5 and 10 minutes enrolled passengers do not even
need to assert their identity. They just look at the camera in the automated lanes crossing
an IRIS barrier in about 20 seconds. Until now several different large-scale iris recognition
systems have been successfully deployed.
However, the broad use of biometric technologies have raised many concerns. From the
privacy perspective most concerns arise from the storage and misuse of biometric data
(Cimato et al., 2009). Besides the fact that users share biometric traits rather reluctantly
biometric applications are often considered as a threat to privacy (Jain et al., 2006). These
concerns are well-justified since physiological biometric traits are irrevocable in the sense
that these cannot be modified during the lifetime of a data subject. In case biometric
traits are compromised these become useless and biometric authentication based on these
traits must not be considered secure anymore. A rather recent field of research which is
referred to as Biometric Cryptosystems (Uludag et al., 2004) is expected to increase the
confidence in biometric authentication systems as this technology offers novel solutions to
biometric template protection (Jain, Flynn & Ross, 2008) and, thus, preserves the privacy of
biometric traits. Approaches to biometric cryptosystems have been proposed for different
biometric characteristics (including behavioral modalities) where the best performing systems
are based on iris (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2009a). As iris biometric cryptosystems have rather
recently emerged a systematic classification and in-depth discussion of existing approaches
is presented in this chapter. Furthermore, custom implementations of existing systems are
presented and evaluated on open databases. Based on the experimental study the reader is
provided with a in-depth discussion of the state-of-the-art in iris biometric cryptosystems,
which completes this work.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 the fundamentals of iris
recognition are briefly summarized. Subsequently, biometric template protection is motived
and template protection schemes are categorized in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 relatedworkwith respect
to iris biometric cryptosystems is reviewed. Then custom implementations of key approaches
to iris biometric cryptosystems are presented and evaluated in Sect. 5. A comprehensive
discussion of iris biometric cryptosystems including advantages and applications, the current
state-of-the-art, and open research issues, is presented in Sect. 6. Finally, a summary and a
conclusion is given in Sect. 7.
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2. Fundamentals of (iris) biometric recognition
The term biometrics refers to “automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioral
and biological characteristics” (ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37). Several physiological as well as
behavioral biometric characteristics have been used (Jain, Flynn & Ross, 2008) such as
fingerprints, iris, face, hand, voice, gait, etc., depending on types of applications. Biometric
traits are acquired applying adequate sensors and distinctive features are extracted to form
a biometric template in the enrollment process. During verification (authentication process)
or identification (identification can be handled as a sequence of verifications and screenings)
the system processes another biometric measurement which is compared against the stored
template(s) yielding acceptance or rejection.
Several metrics exist when measuring the performance of biometric systems. Widely used
factors include False Rejection Rate (FRR), False Acceptance Rate (FAR), and Equal Error Rate
(EER) (Jain et al., 2004). While the FRR defines the “proportion of verification transactions
with truthful claims of identity that are incorrectly rejected”, the FAR defines the “proportion
of verification transactions with wrongful claims of identity that are incorrectly confirmed”
(ISO/IEC FDIS 19795-1). The Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) is defined as, GAR = 1 -
FRR. As score distributions overlap, FAR and FRR intersect at a certain point, defining the
EER of the system. According to intra- and inter-class accumulations generated by biometric
algorithms, FRRs and FARs are adjusted by varying system thresholds. In general decreasing
the FRR (=̂ increasing the GAR) increases the FAR and vice versa.
2.1 Iris recognition
Among all biometric characteristics the pattern of an iris texture is believed to be the most
distinguishable among different people (Bowyer et al., 2007). The iris is the annular area
between the pupil and the sclera of the eye. Breakthrough work to create iris recognition
algorithms was proposed by J. G. Daugman, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.
Daugman’s algorithms (Daugman, 2004) for which he holds key patents form the basis of the
vast majority of today’s commercially dispread iris recognition systems. According to these
algorithms generic iris recognition systems consist of four stages: (1) image acquisition, (2)
iris image preprocessing, (3) iris texture feature extraction, and (4) feature matching.
With respect to the image acquisition good-quality images are necessary to provide a robust
iris recognition system. Hence, one disadvantage of iris recognition systems is the fact that
users have to cooperate fully with the system. At preprocessing the pupil and the outer
boundary of the iris are detected. An example of this process is illustrated in Figure 2 (a)-(b).
Subsequently, the vast majority of iris recognition algorithms un-wrappes the iris ring to a
normalized rectangular iris texture, shown in Figure 2 (c). To complete the preprocessing
the contrast of the resulting iris texture is enhanced applying histogram stretching methods.
Based on the preprocessed iris texture, which is shown in Figure 2 (d) feature extraction
is applied. Again, most iris recognition algorithms follow the approach of Daugman by
extracting a binary feature vector, which is commonly referred to as iris-code. While Daugman
suggests to apply 2D-Gabor filters in the feature extraction stage plenty of different methods
have been proposed (for further details see Bowyer et al. (2007)). An example of an iris-code
is shown in Figure 2 (e). In most matching methods iris-codes are compared by applying the
bit-wise XOR-operator to count miss-matching bits such that the Hamming distance indicates
the grade of dissimilarity (small values indicate high similarity). In order to compensate
against head tilts template alignment is achieved by applying circular shifts in both directions
where the minimal Hamming distance between two iris-codes refers to an optimal alignment.
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Fig. 2. Common processing chain in iris recognition: (a) image of eye (b) detection of pupil
and iris (c) unrolled iris texture (d) preprocessed iris texture (e) sample iris-code.
Hence, the matching of iris-codes can be performed in an efficient process, which can be
parallelized easily. In contrast to other biometric systems based on different modalities
which require a more complex matching procedure thousands of comparisons can be done
within one second. With respect to biometric recognition systems operating in identification
mode iris recognition algorithms are capable of handling large-scale databases. In addition,
potential occlusions originating from eye lids or eye lashes are masked out during matching
by storing a bit-mask generated in the preprocessing step.
3. Biometric template protection
Biometric cryptosystems are designed to securely bind a digital key to a biometric or generate
a digital key from a biometric (Cavoukian& Stoianov, 2009a). Biometric cryptosystems release
cryptographic keys which are associated with the biometric traits of registered users. Hence,
biometric cryptosystems offer solutions to secure biometric-based key management as well as
biometric template protection. Since authentication is performed indirectly by verifying key
validities the system does not need to store the original biometric templates. In addition, most
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Fig. 3. Performance measurement: (a) generic biometric system (b) biometric cryptosystem in
which the return of hundred percent correct keys indicates genuine users.
biometric cryptosystems provide mechanisms to update these keys at any time so that users
are able to apply different keys at different applications.
In the context of biometric cryptosystems the meanings of the aforementioned biometric
performance metrics change. Threshold-based authentication is eliminated since acceptance
requires the generation or retrieval of a hundred percent correct key. The fundamental
difference within performance measurements regarding generic biometric systems and
biometric cryptosystems is illustrated in Figure 3 (a)-(b). The FRR of a biometric cryptosystem
defines the percentage of incorrect keys returned to genuine users (again, GAR = 1 - FRR).
By analogy, the FAR defines the percentage of correct keys returned to non-genuine users.
Compared to existing biometric systems, biometric cryptosystems tend to reveal noticeably
inferior performance (Uludag et al., 2004). This is because within biometric cryptosystem the
enrolled template is not seen and, therefore, can not be adjusted for the direct comparison
with a given biometric sample. In addition, biometric recognition systems are capable of
setting more precise thresholds to adjust the tolerance of the system.
The majority of biometric cryptosystems require the storage of biometric dependent public
information which is referred to as helper data (Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2008) (biometric
cryptosystems are often referred to as helper data-based methods). Due to the natural
variance in biometric measurements it is not possible for most biometric traits to extract a
cryptographic key directly. Additionally, the application of helper data provides revocability
of the generated keys. The stored helper data, which must not reveal any significant
information about the original biometric signal, is applied to extract a key. The comparison
of biometric templates is performed indirectly by verifying the validity of keys, so that the
output of the authentication process is either a key or a failure message. The verification of
keys represents a biometric comparison in the cryptographic domain (Jain et al., 2005). Hence,
biometric cryptosystems can be applied as a means of biometric template protection (Jain,
Nandakumar &Nagar, 2008). Based on how helper data are derived, biometric cryptosystems
are further classified as key-binding or key-generation systems as shown in Figure 4 (a)-(b).
3.1 Key-generation and key-binding
Within a key-binding scheme helper data is obtained by binding a chosen cryptographic key
to biometric features. As a result of the binding process a fusion of the secret key and the
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Fig. 4. Key-Binding and Key-Generation: (a) the basic concept of a key-binding scheme (b)
the basic concept of a key-generation scheme.
biometric template is stored, which does neither reveal any information about the key nor
about the original biometric data. Applying an appropriate key retrieval algorithm, keys are
extracted out of the stored helper data during biometric authentication (Uludag et al., 2004).
The cryptographic key is independent of biometric features so that the key is updateable while
an update of the key usually requires re-enrollment in order to generate new helper data. The
general operation mode of a key-binding scheme is illustrated in Figure 4 (a).
In a key-generation scheme the helper data is derived only from the biometric template so
that the cryptographic key is directly generated from the helper data and a given biometric
sample (Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2008). While the storage of helper data is not obligatory
the majority of proposed key-generation schemes do store helper data. If key-generation
schemes extract keys without the use of any helper data these keys can not be changed in
case of compromise, unless the key-generation algorithm is undergone a change. This means,
stored helper data allows updating cryptographic keys. Key generation schemes in which
helper data are applied are also called “fuzzy extractors” or “secure sketches” as described in
(Dodis et al., 2004) (for both primitives, formalisms are defined). A fuzzy extractor reliably
extracts a uniformly random string from a biometric input while public information is used to
reconstruct that string from another biometric measure. In contrast, in a secure sketch public
helper data is applied to recover the original biometric template from another biometric input.
In Figure 4 (b) the basic concept of a generic key-generation scheme is illustrated.
Several approaches to biometric cryptosystems can be used as both, key-generation schemes
and key-binding schemes (e.g. Juels & Sudan (2002); Juels & Wattenberg (1999)). Hybrid
approaches which make use of both of these basic concepts (e.g. Boult et al. (2007)) have been
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Fig. 5. Example of cancellable iris biometrics: (a) original iris texture. (b) transformed iris
texture based on block permutation. (c) transformed iris texture based on surface folding.
proposed as well. Furthermore, schemes which declare diverse goals such as enhancing the
security of any kind of existing secret (e.g. Monrose et al. (1999)) have been introduced. In
contrast to key-binding and key-generation schemes so-called key-release schemes represent
a loose coupling of biometric authentication and key-release (Uludag et al., 2004). While
the loose coupling of biometrics and the cryptographic system allows to exchange both
components easily this loose coupling emerges as a great drawback as well, since it implies
the separate storage of biometric templates and keys and, thus, offers more vulnerabilities to
conduct attacks. Key-release schemes are hardly appropriate for high security applications
and not usually considered a biometric cryptosystem at all.
3.2 Cancellable biometrics
Cancellable biometrics consist of intentional, repeatable distortions of biometric signals based
on transforms which provide a matching of biometric templates in the transformed domain
(Ratha et al., 2001). Focusing on iris biometrics several different transforms have been
proposed (e.g. Hämmerle-Uhl et al. (2009); Zuo et al. (2008)), in addition generic approaches
which could be applied to iris have been presented (e.g. BioHashing in Teoh et al. (2004)).
These transforms are designed in a way that it should be impossible to recover the original
biometric data. An example of generating cancellable iris biometrics is shown in Figure
5. Additionally, the correlation of several transformed templates should not reveal any
information about the original biometrics. If the transformed biometric data is compromised,
transform parameters are changed, which means, the biometric template is updated. To
prevent impostors from tracking users by cross-matching databases it is suggested to apply
different transforms for different applications. Approaches to cancellable biometrics represent
solutions to biometric template protection, too. In contrast to biometric cryptosystems
cancellable biometrics do not associate cryptographic keys with biometric data.
3.3 Privacy aspects
Most concerns against biometric technologies arise from the abuse of personal data as well
as the permanent tracking and observation of activities (Cimato et al., 2009). As previously
185The S ate-of-the-Art in Iris Biometric Cryptosystems
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which the biometric template itself serves as cryptographic key.
mentioned, in case raw biometric traits are compromised these become useless and biometric
authentication based on these traits must not be considered secure anymore. Biometric
cryptosystems (as well as cancellable biometrics) are expected to increase the confidence
in biometric authentication systems. This is because these technologies offer solutions
to biometric template protection (Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2008) and, thus, preserve
the privacy of biometric traits. The fundamental feature within both technologies is that
comparisons of biometric templates are performed in the encrypted domain (Uludag et al.,
2004). Compared to template encryption techniques, where biometric templates are exposed
during each authentication, here biometric templates are permanently secured. Furthermore,
different versions of secured biometric templates can be applied in different applications
(Ratha et al., 2001) which prevents from the tracking of users. In case of compromise the
reconstruction of original biometric data is hardly feasible for impostors while protected
biometric templates are easily updated. Additionally, biometric cryptosystems provide
techniques to biometric dependent key-release.
4. Iris biometric cryptosystems
Biometric cryptosystems have been designed for diverse physiological and behavioral
biometric characteristics (further details can be found in Cavoukian & Stoianov (2009a)). In
the following subchapters key concepts to biometric cryptosystems which have been applied
to iris biometrics are discussed in detail.
4.1 Private template scheme
The first to propose an iris biometric key-generation scheme were Davida et al. (Davida et al.,
1998; 1999) in their “private template” scheme, inwhich the biometric template itself (or a hash
value of it) serves as a cryptographic key. The basic operation mode of a private template
scheme, which requires the storage of helper data, is illustrated in Figure 6. In the private
template scheme helper data are error correction check bits which are applied to correct faulty
bits of a given iris-code. In the enrollment process M 2048-bit iris-codes are generated which
are put through a majority decoder to reduce the Hamming distance between iris-codes. This
majority decoder computes the vectorVec(V) = (V1,V2, ...,Vn) for a n-bit code vector, denoted
186 State of the Art in Biometrics
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key, prepared with error correction codes, is bound to a binary feature vector.
by Vec(vi) = (vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,n), where Vj = majority(v1,j, v2,j, ..., vM,j). The common metric for
Vj is themajority of 0’s and 1’s of bit j from each of the M vectors. Amajority decoded iris-code
T, denoted by Vec(T), is concatenated with check digits Vec(C), to generate Vec(T)||Vec(C).
The check digits Vec(C) are part of an error correction code. Then a hash value Hash(Name,
Attr, Vec(T)||Vec(C)) is generated, where Name is the user’s name, Attr are public attributes
of the user and Hash(·) is a hash function. Finally, an authorization officer signs this hash
resulting in Sig(Hash(Name, Attr, Vec(T)||Vec(C))). During authentication several iris-codes
are captured andmajority decoded resulting inVec(T′). With the use ofVec(C)which is stored
as part of the template (helper data) the corrected template Vec(T′′) is constructed. In the end,
Hash(Name, Attr, Vec(T′′)||Vec(C)) is calculated and Sig(Hash(Name, Attr, Vec(T′′)||Vec(C)))
is checked. Experimental results are omitted and it is commonly expected that the proposed
system reveals poor performance due to the fact that the authors restrict to the assumption that
only 10% of bits of an iris-code change among different iris images of a single data subject.
But in general, average intra-class distances of iris-codes lie within 20-30%. Additionally,
implementations of the proposed majority decoding technique (e.g. in Yang & Verbauwhede
(2007)) were not found to decrease intra-class distances to that extent.
4.2 Fuzzy commitment scheme
Juels and Wattenberg (Juels & Wattenberg, 1999) combined techniques from the area of error
correcting codes and cryptography to achieve a type of cryptographic primitive entitled
“fuzzy commitment” scheme. A fuzzy commitment scheme consists of a function F, used
to commit a codeword c ∈ C and a witness x ∈ {0, 1}n. The set C is a set of error correcting
codewords c of length n and x represents a bit stream of length n, termed witness (biometric
data). The difference vector of c and x, δ ∈ {0, 1}n where x = c + δ, and a hash value h(c)
are stored as the commitment termed F(c, x) (secure biometric template). Each x′, which is
sufficiently “close” to x, according to an appropriate metric, should be able to reconstruct
c using the difference vector δ to translate x′ in the direction of x. A hash of the result is
tested against h(c). With respect to biometric key-binding the system acquires a witness x
at enrollment, selects a codeword c ∈ C, calculates the commitment F(c, x) (δ and h(c)) and
stores it in a database. At the time of authentication, a witness x′ is acquired and the system
checks whether x′ yields a successful decommitment. Figure 7 shows the basic operation
mode of a fuzzy commitment scheme.
The fuzzy commitment scheme was applied to iris-codes by Hao et al. (Hao et al., 2006). In
their scheme 2048-bit iris-codes are applied to bind and retrieve 140-bit cryptographic keys
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prepared with Hadamard and Reed-Solomon error correction codes. Hadamard codes are
applied to eliminate bit errors originating from the natural variance and Reed-Solomon codes
are applied to correct burst errors resulting from distortions. The system was tested with
700 iris images of 70 subjects achieving a GAR of 99.53% and a zero FAR. These are rather
impressive results which were not achieved until then. In order to provide a more accurate
error correction decoding in an iris-based fuzzy commitment scheme, which gets close to a
theoretical bound obtained by Bringer et al. (Bringer et al., 2007; 2008), the authors apply
two-dimensional iterativemin-sumdecoding. Within their approach amatrix is createdwhere
lines as well as columns are formed by two different binary Reed-Muller codes. Thereby
a more efficient decoding is available. Adapting the proposed scheme to the standard iris
recognition algorithm of Daugman a GAR of 94.38% is achieved for the binding of 40-bit
cryptographic keys. Due to the fact that Bringer et al. apply their scheme to diverse data sets
a more significant performance evaluation than that of Hao et al. (Hao et al., 2006) is provided.
Rathgeb and Uhl (Rathgeb & Uhl, 2009b) provide a systematic approach to the construction
of fuzzy commitment schemes based on iris biometrics. After analyzing the error distribution
in iris-codes of different iris recognition algorithms, Reed-Solomon and Hadamard codes are
applied, similar to Hao et al. (Hao et al., 2006). Experimental results provide a GAR of 95.08%
and 93.43% for adopting the fuzzy commitment approach to two different iris recognition
algorithms. In other further work (Rathgeb & Uhl, 2009a) the authors apply a context-based
reliable component selection in order to extract cryptographic keys from iris-codes which are
then bound to Hadamard codewords resulting in a GAR of 93.47% at zero FAR. Besides,
different techniques to improve the performance of iris based fuzzy commitment schemes
have been proposed (Rathgeb & Uhl, 2010a; Zhang et al., 2009).
4.3 Fuzzy vault scheme
One of the most popular biometric cryptosystems called “fuzzy vault” was introduced by
Juels and Sudan (Juels & Sudan, 2002). The key idea of the fuzzy vault scheme is to use an
unordered set A to lock a secret key k, yielding a vault, denoted by VA. If another set B
overlaps largely with A, k can be reconstructed, which means the vault VA is unlocked. The
vault is created applying polynomial encoding and error correction. During the enrollment
phase a polynom p is selected which encodes the key k in some way (e.g. the coefficients of p
are formed by k), denoted by p ← k. Then the elements of A are projected onto the polynom
p, i.e. p(A) is calculated. Additionally, so-called chaff points are added in order to obscure
genuine points of the polynom. The set of all points, called R, forms the template. To achieve
a successful authentication another set B needs to overlap with A sufficiently. If this is the case
it is possible to locate many points in R that lie on p. Applying error correction codes p can be
reconstructed and, hence, k. The components of a fuzzy vault scheme are illustrated in Figure
8. The security of the whole scheme lies in the infeasibility of the polynomial reconstruction
and the number of applied chaff points. In contrast to the aforementioned fuzzy commitment
scheme the main advantage of this approach is the feature of order invariance, i.e. to be able to
cope with unordered data. For example, the minutiae points of a captured fingerprint are not
necessarily ordered from one measurement to another with respect to specific directions due
to fingerprint displacement, rotations and contrast changes. If features are formed by relative
positions, unordered sets of minutiae points will still be able to reconstruct the secret.
Apart from fingerprints, which is the most apart biometric characteristic for this scheme (e.g.
in Clancy et al. (2003); Nandakumar et al. (2007)) iris biometrics have been applied in fuzzy
vault schemes by Lee et al. (Lee, Bae, Lee, Park & Kim, 2007). Since iris features are usually
88 State of the Art in Biometrics
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Fig. 8. Fuzzy vault scheme: the basic operation mode of the fuzzy vault scheme in which a
unordered set of biometric features is mapped on to a secret polynom.
ordered, in order to obtain an unordered set of features, independent component analysis is
applied obtaining a GAR of 99.225% at a zero FAR. Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2008a;b) proposed a
fuzzy vault based on iris biometrics as well. After image acquisition and preprocessing the iris
texture is divided into 64 blocks where for each block the mean gray scale value is calculated
resulting in 256 features which are normalized to integers to reduce noise. At the same time, a
Reed-Solomon code is generated and subsequently the feature vector is translated to a cipher
key using a hash function. The authors report a FAR of 0.0% and a GAR of approximately
94.45% for a total number of over 100 persons. Reddy and Babu (Reddy& Babu, 2008) enhance
the security of a classic fuzzy vault scheme based on iris biometrics by adding a password
with which the vault as well as the secret key is hardened. In experiments a system which
exhibits a GAR of 92% and a FAR of 0.03% is hardened, resulting in a GAR of 90.2% and
a FAR of 0.0%. However, if passwords are compromised the systems security decreases to
that of a standard one, thus the FAR of 0.0% was calculated under unrealistic preconditions
(Rathgeb & Uhl, 2010b). A multi-biometric fuzzy vault based on fingerprint and iris was
proposed by Nandakumar and Jain (Nandakumar & Jain, 2008). The authors demonstrate
that a combination of biometric modalities leads to better recognition performance and higher
security. A GAR of 98.2% at a FAR of∼ 0.01%, while the corresponding GAR values of the iris
and fingerprint fuzzy vaults are 88.0% and 78.8%, respectively.
5. Implementation of iris biometric cryptosystems
In oder to provide a technical insight to the implementation iris biometric cryptosystems
different iris biometric feature extraction algorithms are applied to different variations of
iris-based fuzzy commitment schemes. The construction of these schemes is described in
detail and the resulting systems are evaluated on a comprehensive data set.
5.1 Biometric databases
Experiments are carried out using the CASIAv3-Interval iris database1 as well as on the IIT
Delhi iris database v12, two public available iris datasets. Both databases consist of good
quality NIR illuminated indoor images, sample images of both databases are shown in Figure
1 The Center of Biometrics and Security Research, CASIA Iris Image Database, URL:
http://www.idealtest.org
2 The IIT Delhi Iris Database version 1.0, URL:
http://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/~csajaykr/IITD/Database_Iris.htm
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Data Set Persons Classes Images Resolution
CASIAv3-Interval 250 396 2639 320×280
IITDv1 224 448 2240 320×240
Total 474 844 4879 –
Table 1. Databases applied in experimental evaluations.
Fig. 9. Sample images of single classes of the CASIAv3-Interval database (above) and the
IITDv1 database (below).
9. These datasets are fused in order to obtain one comprehensive test set. The resulting test
set consists of over 800 classes as shown in Table 1 allowing a comprehensive evaluation of
the proposed systems.
5.2 Preprocessing and feature extraction
In the preprocessing step the pupil and the iris of a given sample image are located applying
Canny edge detection and Hough circle detection. More advanced iris detection techniques
are not considered, however, as the same detection is applied for all experimental evaluations
obtained results retain their significance. Once the pupil and iris circles are localized, the
area between them is transformed to a normalized rectangular texture of 512 × 64 pixel,
according to the “rubbersheet” approach by Daugman (Daugman, 2004). As a final step,
lighting across the texture is normalized using block-wise brightness estimation. An example
of a preprocessed iris image is shown in Figure 2 (e).
In the feature extraction stage we employ custom implementations of two different algorithms
used to extract binary iris-codes. The first one was proposed by Ma et al. (Ma et al., 2004).
Within this approach the texture is divided into 10 stripes to obtain 5 one-dimensional signals,
each one averaged from the pixels of 5 adjacent rows, hence, the upper 512 × 50 pixel of
preprocessed iris textures are analyzed. A dyadic wavelet transform is then performed on
each of the resulting 10 signals, and two fixed subbands are selected from each transform
resulting in a total number of 20 subbands. In each subband all local minima and maxima
above a adequate threshold are located, and a bit-code alternating between 0 and 1 at each
extreme point is extracted. Utilizing 512 bits per signal, the final code comprises a total
number of 512× 20 = 10240 bits.
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Algorithm p σ DoF (bit) EER (%)
Ma et al. 0.4965 0.0143 1232 0.4154
Log-Gabor 0.4958 0.0202 612 0.6446
p ... mean Hamming distance
σ ... standard deviation
DoF ... degrees of freedom
Table 2. Benchmark Values of applied Feature Extraction Algorithms.
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Fig. 10. Receiver operation characteristic curves for the algorithm of Ma et al. and the
Log-Gabor feature extraction.
The second feature extraction method follows an implementation by Masek3 in which filters
obtained from a Log-Gabor function are applied. Here a row-wise convolution with a
complex Log-Gabor filter is performed on the texture pixels. The phase angle of the resulting
complex value for each pixel is discretized into 2 bits. To have a code comparable to the first
algorithm, we use the same texture size and row-averaging into 10 signals prior to applying
the one-dimensional Log-Gabor filter. The 2 bits of phase information are used to generate
a binary code, which therefore is again 512 × 20 = 10240 bit. This algorithm is somewhat
similar to Daugman’s use of Log-Gabor filters, but it works only on rows as opposed to the
2-dimensional filters used by Daugman.
A major issue regarding biometric cryptosystems is the entropy of biometric data. If
cryptographic keys are associatedwith biometric features which suffer from low entropy these
are easily compromised (e.g. by performing false acceptance attacks). In fact it has been shown
that the iris exhibits enough reliable information to bind or extract cryptographic keys, which
are sufficiently long to be applied in generic cryptosystems (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2009a). A
common way of measuring the entropy of iris biometric systems was proposed in Daugman
(2003). By calculating the mean p and standard deviation σ of the binomial distribution of
iris-code Hamming distances the entropy of the iris recognition algorithm, which is referred
to as “degrees of freedom”, is defined as p · (1− p)/σ2. For both algorithms these magnitudes
are summarized in Table 2 including the equal error rates (EERs) for the entire dataset. As
can be seen both algorithms provide enough entropy to bind and retrieve at least 128 bit
cryptographic keys. The receiver operation characteristic (ROC) curve of both algorithms are
plotted in Figure 10. For the algorithm of Ma et al. and Masek a GAR of 98.98% and 98.18% is
obtained at a FAR of 0.01%, respectively. While both recognition systems obtain EERs below
3 L. Masek: Recognition of Human Iris Patterns for Biometric Identification, University of Western
Australia, 2003, URL: http://www.csse.uwa.edu.au/~pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
191The S ate-of-the-Art in Iris Biometric Cryptosystems
www.intechopen.com
14 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0  4  8  12  16  20  24  28  32  36  40  44  48  52  56  60  64  68  72  76  80
R
el
at
iv
e 
M
at
ch
 C
o
u
n
t 
(%
)
Number of Block Errors
False Rejection Rate
False Acceptance Rate
(a)
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0  4  8  12  16  20  24  28  32  36  40  44  48  52  56  60  64  68  72  76  80
R
el
at
iv
e 
M
at
ch
 C
o
u
n
t 
(%
)
Number of Block Errors
False Rejection Rate
False Acceptance Rate
(b)
Fig. 11. False rejection rate and false acceptance rates for the fuzzy commitment scheme of
Hao et al. for the feature extraction of (a) Ma et al. and (b) the Log-Gabor algorithm.
1% the recognition performance is expected to decrease for the according fuzzy commitment
schemes (Uludag et al., 2004).
5.3 Fuzzy commitment schemes
The first fuzzy commitment scheme follows the approach of Hao et al. (Hao et al., 2006). In the
original proposal a 140-bit cryptographic key is encoded with Hadamard and Reed-Solomon
codes. While Hadamard codes are applied to correct natural variance between iris-codes
Reed-Solomon codes handle remaining burst errors (resulting from distortions such as eyelids
or eyelashes). For the applied algorithm of Ma et al. and the Log-Gabor feature extraction
we found that the application of Hadamard codewords of 128-bit and a Reed-Solomon code
RS(16, 80) reveals the best experimental results for the binding of 128-bit cryptographic keys
(Rathgeb & Uhl, 2009b). At key-binding, a 16·8 = 128 bit cryptographic key R is first prepared
with a RS(16, 80) Reed-Solomon code. The Reed-Solomon error correction code operates
on block level and is capable of correcting (80 – 16)/2 = 32 block errors. Then the 80 8-bit
blocks are Hadamard encoded. In a Hadamard code codewords of length n are mapped
to codewords of length 2n−1 in which up to 25% of bit errors can be corrected. Hence, 80
8-bit codewords are mapped to 80 128-bit codewords resulting in a 10240-bit bit stream which
is bound with the iris-code by XORing both. Additionally, a hash of the original key h(R)
is stored as second part of the commitment. At authentication key retrieval is performed
by XORing an extracted iris-code with the first part of the commitment. The resulting bit
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Algorithm GAR (%) FAR (%) Corrected Blocks
Ma et al. 96.35 0.0095 32
Log-Gabor 95.21 0.0098 27
Table 3. Summarized experimental results for the fuzzy commitment scheme of Hao et al.
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Fig. 12. Genuine acceptance rate for the fuzzy commitment scheme of Hao et al. for the
feature extraction of Ma et al. and the Log-Gabor algorithm.
stream is decoded applying Hadamard decoding and Reed-Solomon decoding afterwards.
The resulting key R′ is then hashed and if h(R′) = h(R) the correct key R is released.
Otherwise an error message is returned.
The second fuzzy commitment scheme was proposed by Bringer et al. (Bringer et al., 2008).
Motivated by their observation that the system in Hao et al. (2006) does not hold the reported
performance rates on data sets captured under unfavorable conditions a more effective error
correction decoding is suggested. The proposed technique which is referred to as Min-Sum
decoding presumes that iris-codes of 2048 bits are arranged in a two-dimensional manner. In
the original system a 40-bit key R is encoded with a two-dimensional Reed-Muller code such
that each 64-bit line represents a codeword and each 32-bit column represents a codeword, too.
To obtain the helper data P the iris-code is XORed with the two-dimensional Reed-Muller
code. It is shown that by applying a row-wise and column-wise Min-Sum decoding the
recognition performance comes near to practical boundaries. In order to adopt the system
to the applied feature extractions 8192 bits of iris-codes are arranged in 64 lines of 128 bits
(best experimental results are achieved for this configuration). To generate the commitment a
56-bit cryptographic key R is used to generate the error correction matrix. Since Reed-Muller
codes are generated using Hadamard matrices and each line and each column of the resulting
two-dimensional code has to be a codeword, 2n + 1 codewords define a total number of 2n+1
codewords. Due to the structure of the error correction code 27·8 = 256 possible configurations
of the 128× 64 = 8192-bit error correction code exist. At authentication a given iris-code is
XORed with the commitment and the iterative Min-Sum decoding is applied until the correct
key R is retrieved or a predefined threshold is reached.
With respect to iris biometrics cryptosystems these variations of the fuzzy commitment
scheme represent the best performing systems in literature (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2009a).
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Fig. 13. False rejection rate and false acceptance rates for the fuzzy commitment scheme of
Bringer et al. for the feature extraction of (a) Ma et al. and (b) the Log-Gabor algorithm.
5.4 Performance evaluation
According to the fuzzy commitment scheme of Hao et al. the FRR and FAR for the algorithm
of Ma et al. is plotted in Figure 11 (a) according to the number of corrected block errors after
Hadamard decoding. In contrast to generic biometric systems only discrete thresholds can be
set in order to distinguish between genuine and non-genuine persons. The characteristics of
the FRR and FAR for the algorithm ofMa et al. is rather similar to that of the Log-Gabor feature
extraction which is plotted in Figure 11 (b). Block-level error correction is necessary for both
feature extraction methods in order to correct burst errors. As previously mentioned, for both
algorithms the maximal number of block errors that can be handled by the Reed-Solomon
code is 32, which suffices in both cases. In Figure 12 the GARs for both feature extraction
methods are plotted according to the number of corrected block errors where the according
FARs are required to be less than 0.01%. For the algorithm of Ma et al. a GAR of 96.35% and a
FAR of 0.0095% is obtained where the full error correction capacity is exploited. With respect
to the Log-Gabor feature extraction a GAR of 95.21% and a FAR of 0.0098% are achieved
where 27 block errors are corrected, respectively. Table 3 summarizes obtained performance
rates for both iris biometric feature extraction methods. Like in the original iris recognition
systems the algorithm of Ma et al. performs better than the Log-Gabor feature extraction.
However, as it was expected for both methods accuracy decreases. This is because error
correction is designed to correct random noise while iris-codes do not exhibit a uniform
distribution of mismatching bits (distinct parts of iris-code comprise more reliable bits than
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Algorithm GAR (%) FAR (%) Decoding Iterations
Ma et al. 96.99 0.01 20
Log-Gabor 93.06 0.01 6
Table 4. Summarized experimental results for the fuzzy commitment scheme of Bringer et al.
 70
 72
 74
 76
 78
 80
 82
 84
 86
 88
 90
 92
 94
 96
 98
 100
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24
G
A
R
 (
%
) 
(F
A
R
 <
 0
.0
1
)
Number of Decoding Iterations
Ma et al.
Log-Gabor
Fig. 14. Genuine acceptance rate for the fuzzy commitment scheme of Bringer et al. or the
feature extraction of Ma et al. and the Log-Gabor algorithm.
others (Rathgeb et al., 2010)) and, in addition, decision thresholds can not be set as precise as
in generic biometric systems. Furthermore, the resulting fuzzy commitment schemes show
worse performance rates than those reported in Hao et al. (2006), which is because those
results were achieved for a rather small test set of iris images captured under ideal conditions.
Therefore, the achieved results in this work are more significant as these are obtained from
different test sets for different feature extraction methods.
In the second fuzzy commitment scheme which follows the approach in Bringer et al. (2008)
iterative decoding of rows and columns of two-dimensional iris-codes is performed. Figure
13 (a)-(b) shows the FRRs and FARs for both feature extraction methods according to the
number of decoding iteration, necessary to retrieve the correct key. Again, the characteristics
of FRRs and FARs are rather similar for both algorithms. In Figure 14 the GARs for both
feature extraction methods are plotted according to the number of decoding iterations where
the according FARs are required to be less than 0.01%. For the algorithm of Ma et al. and
the Log-Gabor feature extraction a GAR of 96.99% and 93.06% are obtained according to a
FAR of 0.01%, respectively. Table 4 summarizes obtained performance rates for the fuzzy
commitment scheme of Bringer et al. for both iris biometric feature extraction methods. For
the applied dataset the scheme of Bringer et al. does not show any significant improvement
compared to that of Hao et al., although it is believed that the scheme of Bringer et al. works
better on non-ideal iris images since error correction is applied iteratively. In other words, in
the scheme of Hao et al. error correction capacities may be hit to the limit under non-ideal
conditions while in the scheme of Bringer et al. a larger amount of decoding iterations is
expected to yield successful key retrieval. However, as a two-dimensional arrangement of
error correction codewords is required the according retrieved keys are rather short compared
to the approach of Hao et al. In contrast to the first fuzzy commitment scheme results reported
in Bringer et al. (2008) coincide with the ones obtained.
For both implementations of iris-based fuzzy commitment schemes obtained performance
rates are promising and by all means comparable to those reported in literature. Furthermore,
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the systematic construction of these schemes, which does not require any custom-built
optimizations, underlines the potential of iris biometric cryptosystems.
6. Discussion
After presenting key technologies in the areas of biometric cryptosystems and an
implementations of iris-based fuzzy commitment schemes a concluding discussion is done.
For this purpose major advantages and potential applications are discussed. An overview of
the performance of existing state-of-the-art approaches is given and, finally, open issues and
challenges are discussed.
6.1 Advantages and applications
Biometric cryptosystems offer several advantages over conventional biometric systems. Major
advantages can be summarized as follows:
• Template protection: within biometric cryptosystems the original biometric template is
obscured such that a reconstruction is hardly feasible.
• Biometric-dependent key release: biometric cryptosystems provide key release
mechanisms based on the presentation of biometric data.
• Pseudonymous biometric authentication: authentication is performed in the encrypted
domain and, thus, is pseudonymous.
• Revocability of biometric templates: several instances of secured templates can be
generated by binding or generating different keys.
• Increased security: biometric cryptosystems prevent from several traditional types of
attacks against biometric systems (e.g. substitution attacks).
• Higher social acceptance: due to the above mentioned security benefits the social
acceptance of biometric applications is expected to increase.
These advantages call for several applications. In order to underline the potential of
biometric cryptosystems one essential use case is discussed, pseudonymous biometric
databases. Biometric cryptosystems meet the requirements of launching pseudonymous
biometric databases (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2009a) since these provide a comparison of
biometric templates in the encrypted domain. Stored templates (helper data) do not reveal
any information about the original biometric data. Additionally, several differently obscured
templates can be used in different applications. At registration the biometric data of the user
is employed as input for a biometric cryptosystem. The user is able to register with several
applications where different templates are stored in each database (as suggested in Ratha et al.
(2001)). Depending on the type of application further user records are linked to the template.
These records should be encrypted where decryption could be applied based on a released
key. Figure 15 shows the scenario of constructing an pseudonymous biometric database.
Due to the fact that stored helper data does not reveal information about the original
biometric data high security in terms of template protection is provided. Since comparison is
performed in the encrypted domain biometric templates are not exposed during comparisons
(Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2008). This means that the authentication process is fully
pseudonymous and, furthermore, activities of users are untraceable because different secured
templates are applied in different databases.
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Fig. 15. Pseudonymous databases: users authenticate indirect at a biometric database and
access their stored records in a secure way, such that the activities of a user are not traceable.
6.2 The state-of-the-art
In early approaches to iris biometric cryptosystems such as the private template scheme
(Davida et al., 1998), performance rates were omitted while it has been found that these
schemes suffer from serious security vulnerabilities (Uludag et al., 2004). Representing one
of the simplest key-binding approaches the fuzzy commitment scheme (Juels & Wattenberg,
1999) has been successfully applied to iris and other biometrics, too. Iris-codes, generated
by applying common feature extraction methods, seem to exhibit sufficient information to
bind and retrieve cryptographic keys, long enough to be applied in generic cryptosystems.
The fuzzy vault scheme (Juels & Sudan, 2002) which requires real-valued feature vectors
as input has been applied to iris biometrics as well. The best performing iris-biometric
cryptosystems with respect to the applied concept and datasets are summarized in Table 5.
Most existing approaches reveal GARs above 95% according to negligible FARs. While the
fuzzy commitment scheme represents a well-elaborated approach which has been applied
to various feature extraction methods on different data sets (even on non-ideal databases),
existing approaches to iris-based fuzzy vaults are evaluated on rather small datasets which
does not coincide with high security demands.
With respect to other biometric modalities performance rates of key concepts of biometric
cryptosystems are summarized in Table 6. As can be seen iris biometric cryptosystems
outperform the majority of these schemes which do not provide practical performance rates
as well as sufficiently long keys. Thus, it is believed that the state-of-the-art in biometric
cryptosystems in general is headed by iris-based approaches.
6.3 Open issues and challenges
With respect to the design goals, biometric cryptosystems offer significant advantages
to enhance the privacy and security of biometric systems providing reliable biometric
authentication at an high security level. However, several new issues and challenges arise
deploying these technologies (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2009b). One fundamental challenge,
regarding both technologies, represents the issue of alignment, which significantly effects
recognition performance. Biometric templates are obscured within biometric cryptosystems
and, thus, the alignment of these secured templates is highly non-trivial. While focusing on
biometric recognition align-invariant approaches have been proposed for several biometric
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Authors Scheme GAR / FAR Data Set Keybits
Hao et al. (2006)
FCS
99.58 / 0.0 70 persons 140
Bringer et al. (2007) 94.38 / 0.0 ICE 2005 40
Rathgeb & Uhl (2010a) 95.08 / 0.0 CASIA v3 128
Lee, Choi, Toh, Lee & Kim (2007)
FVS
99.225 / 0.0 BERC v1 128
Wu et al. (2008a) 94.55 / 0.73 CASIA v1 1024
FCS ... fuzzy commitment scheme
FVS ... fuzzy vault scheme
Table 5. Experimental results of the best performing Iris-Biometric Cryptosystems.
Authors
Biometric
GAR / FAR Data Set Keybits Remarks
Modality
Clancy et al. (2003) Fingerprint 70-80 / 0.0 not given 224 pre-alignment
Nandakumar et al. (2007) Fingerprint 96.0 / 0.004 FVC2002-DB2 128 2 enroll sam.
Feng & Wah (2002) Online Sig. 72.0 / 1.2 750 persons 40 –
Vielhauer et al. (2002) Online Sig. 92.95 / 0.0 10 persons 24 –
Monrose et al. (2001) Voice < 98.0 / 2.0 90 persons ∼ 60 –
Teoh et al. (2004) Face 0.0 / 0.0 ORL, Faces94 80 non-stolen token
Table 6. Experimental results of key approaches to Biometric Cryptosystems based on other
biometric characteristics.
characteristics, so far, no suggestions have been made to construct align-invariant iris
biometric cryptosystems.
The iris has been found to exhibit enough reliable information to bind or extract cryptographic
keys at practical performance rates, which are sufficiently long to be applied in generic
cryptosystems. Other biometric characteristics such as voice or online-signatures (especially
behavioral biometrics) were found to reveal only a small amount of stable information (see
Table 6). While some modalities may not be suitable to construct a biometric cryptosystem
these can still be applied to improve the security of an existing secret. Additionally, several
biometric characteristics can be combined to construct multi-biometric cryptosystems (e.g.
Nandakumar & Jain (2008)), which have received only little consideration so far. Thereby
security is enhanced and feature vectors can be merged to extract enough reliable data. While
for iris biometrics the extraction of a sufficient amount of reliable features seems to be feasible
it still remains questionable if these features exhibit enough entropy. In case extracted data do
not meet the requirement of high discriminativity the system becomes vulnerable to several
attacks. This means, biometric cryptosystems which tend to release keys which suffer from
low entropy are easily compromised (e.g. performing false acceptance attacks). Besides
the vulnerability of releasing low entropy keys, which may be easily guessed, several other
attacks to biometric cryptosystems have been proposed (especially against the fuzzy vault
scheme). Therefore, the claimed security of these technologies remains unclear and further
improvement to prevent from these attacks is necessary. While some key approaches have
already been exposed to fail the security demands more sophisticated security studies for all
approaches are required. Due to the sensitivity of biometric key-binding and key-generation
systems, sensoring and preprocessing may require improvement, too.
As plenty different approaches to biometric cryptosystems have been proposed a large
number of pseudonyms and acronyms have been dispersed across literature such that
attempts to represented biometric template protection schemes in unified architectures have
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been made (Breebaart et al., 2008). In addition a standardization on biometric template
protection is currently under work in the ISO/IEC FCD 24745 (Breebaart et al., 2009).
7. Summary and conclusion
Iris recognition has been established as a reliable means of performing access control in
various types of applications. Existing algorithms (see Bowyer et al. (2007)) have been
well-tested on public datasets meeting the requirements of handling large-scale databases
(even in identification mode). However, iris recognition systems still require further
improvement with respect to biometric template protection. Biometric templates can be lost,
stolen, duplicated, or compromised enabling potential impostors to intrude user accounts
and, furthermore, track and observe user activities. Biometric cryptosystems (Uludag
et al., 2004), which represent a rather recent field of research offer solutions to biometric
template protection as well as biometric-dependent key-release. Within approaches to
biometric cryptosystems cryptographic keys are associated with fuzzy biometric data where
authentication is performed in a secure manner, indirectly via key validities.
The iris, the sphincter around the pupil of a person’s eye, has been found to be the most
suitable biometric characteristic to be applied in biometric cryptosystems. In this chapter
a comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art in iris biometric cryptosystems is given.
After discussing the fundamentals of iris recognition and biometric cryptosystems existing
key concepts are reviewed and implementations of different variations of iris-based fuzzy
commitment schemes (Juels &Wattenberg, 1999) are presented. Based on the obtained results,
which underline the potential of iris biometric cryptosystems, a concluding discussion is
given, including advantages and applications of biometric cryptosystems as well as open
issues and challenges.
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